Security Analysis on "An Authentication Code Against Pollution Attacks
  in Network Coding" by Zhang, Jun et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
3.
05
57
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  3
 M
ar 
20
13
SECURITY ANALYSIS ON “ AN AUTHENTICATION CODE AGAINST
POLLUTION ATTACKS IN NETWORK CODING”
JUN ZHANG, XINRAN LI AND FANG-WEI FU
Abstract. We analyze the security of the authentication code against pollution attacks in
network coding given by Oggier and Fathi [1] and show one way to remove one very strong
condition they required. Actually, we find a way to attack their authentication scheme. In
their scheme, they considered that if some malicious nodes in the network collude to make
pollution in the network flow or make substitution attacks to other nodes, they thought
these malicious nodes must solve a system of linear equations to recover the secret param-
eters. Then they concluded that their scheme is an unconditional secure scheme. Actually,
note that the authentication tag in the scheme of Oggier and Fathi is nearly linear on the
messages, so it is very easy for any malicious node to make pollution attack in the network
flow, replacing the vector of any incoming edge by linear combination of his incoming vec-
tors whose coefficients have sum 1. And if the coalition of malicious nodes can carry out
decoding of the network coding, they can easily make substitution attack to any other node
even if they do not know any information of the private key of the node. Moreover, even
if their scheme can work fruitfully, the condition in their scheme H 6 M in a network can
be removed, where H is the sum of numbers of the incoming edges at adversaries. Under
the condition H 6 M, H may be large, so we need large parameter M which increases the
cost of computation a lot. On the other hand, the parameter M can not be very large as it
can not exceed the length of original messages.
1. Introduction
Network coding is a novel technique to achieve the maximum multicast throughput,
which was introduced by Ahlswede et al. [2]. It allows the intermediate node to generate
output data by mixing its received data. In 2003, Li et al. [3] further showed that linear net-
work coding is sufficient to achieve the optimal throughput in multicast networks. Subse-
quently, Ho et al. [4] introduced the concept of random linear network coding, and proved
that it achieves the maximum throughput of multicast network with high probability. Net-
work coding is efficiently applicable to numerous forms of network communications, such
as Internet TV, wireless networks, content distribution networks and P2P networks. Due
to these advantages, network coding attracts many researchers and has developed very
quickly.
However, networks using network coding impose security problems that traditional net-
works do not face. A particularly important problem is the pollution attack. If some nodes
in the network are malicious and inject corrupted packets into the information flow, then
the honest intermediate node mix invalid packet with other packets. According to the rule
of network coding, the corrupted outgoing packets quickly pollute the whole network and
cause all the messages to be decoded wrongly in the destination.
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2013CB834204), and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61171082, 10990011 and
60872025). The author Jun Zhang is also supproted by the Chinese Scholarship Council under the State Scholar-
ship Fund during visiting University of California, Irvine.
1
2 JUN ZHANG, XINRAN LI AND FANG-WEI FU
Recently several related works are proposed to address the pollution attack, such as
homomorphic hashing, digital signature and message authentication code (MAC). Krohn
et al. [5] (see also [6]) used homomorphic hashing function to prevent pollution attacks. Yu
et al. [7] proposed a homomorphic signature scheme based on discrete logarithm and RSA,
which however was showed insecurely by Yun et al. [8]. Charles et al. [9] gave a signature
scheme based on Weil pairing over elliptic curves and provided authentication of the data
in addition to detecting pollution attacks. Zhao et al. [10] designed a signature scheme
that view all blocks of the file as vectors and make use of the fact that all valid vectors
transmitted in the network should belong to the subspace spanned by the original set of
vectors from the file. Boneh et al. [11] proposed two signature schemes that can be used
in conjunction with network coding to prevent malicious modification of messages, and
they showed that their constructions had a lower signature length compared with related
prior work. Boneh et al. [12] constructed a linearly homomorphic signature scheme that
authenticates vectors with coordinates in the binary field F2. It is the first such scheme
based on the hard problem of finding short vectors in integer lattices. Agrawal and Boneh
[13] designed a homomorphic MAC system that allows checking the integrity of network
coded data. These works provide computational security (i.e., the attacker’s resources are
limited) in network coding.
Besides digital signatures and MACs, authentication codes also satisfy the properties
of authentication. However, authentication code provides unconditional security (i.e., the
attacker has unlimited computational power). In the multi-receiver authentication model,
a sender broadcasts an authenticated message such that all the receivers can independently
verify the authenticity of the message with their own private keys. It requires a security that
malicious groups of up to a given size of receivers can not successfully impersonate the
transmitter, or substitute a transmitted message. Desmedt et al. [14] gave an authentication
scheme of single message for multi-receivers. Safavi-Naini and Wang [15] extended the
DFY scheme [14] to be an authentication scheme of multiple messages for multi-receivers.
Note that their construction was not linear over the base field with respect to the message.
Oggier and Fathi [16, 1] made a little modification of the construction so that the con-
struction can be used for network coding, which is actually not secure we will show in
this paper. Tang [17] used homomorphic authentication codes to sign a subspace which
provide an unconditionally security. In fact, Tang in the same paper had noticed that linear
authentication codes for linear network is not secure, so he modified the type of substitution
attack.
Firstly, we recall the general model of network coding and the definition of subspace
codes. In the basic multicast model for linear network coding, a source node s generates
n messages, each consisting of m symbols in the base field Fq. Let {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊆
F
l×1
q represent the set of messages. Based on the messages, the source node s transmits
a message over each outgoing channel. At a node in the network, the symbols on its
outgoing channel are Fq-linear combinations of incoming symbols. For a node i, define
Out(i) = {e ∈ E : e is an outgoing channel of i}, and In(i) = {e ∈ E : e is an incoming
channel of i}. If the channel e of network carries packet y(e), where e ∈ Out(i), and i is
an internal nodes, then y(e) satisfies y(e) = ∑d∈in(i) kdey(d). The |In(i)| × |Out(i)| matrix
Ki = [kde]d∈in(i),e∈Out(i) is called the local encoding kernel at node i. Note that each y(e)
is a linear combination of the messages sent by the source node, so there exists a vector
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fe ∈ F1×nq such that
y(e) = feX, where X =

x1
x2
...
xn

.
The vector fe is called the global encoding vector of channel e. Given the local encod-
ing kernels for all the channels in network, the global encoding kernels can be calculated
recursively in any upstream-to-downstream order as follows
fe =
∑
d∈in(i)
kde fd .
Write the received vectors at a node t as a column vector
At = (y(e) : e ∈ In(t))T =

y(e1)
y(e2)
...
y(ee(t))

,
where In(t) = {e1, e2, · · · , ee(t)}. Then we have the decoding equation at the node t
Ft · X = At ,
where
Ft = ( fe : e ∈ In(t))T =

fe1
fe2
...
fee(t)

is called the global encoding kernel at the node t.
2. The Authentication Scheme of Oggier and Fathi
Oggier and Fathi constructed an authentication code against pollution and substitution
attacks in network coding, and they proved that the scheme is unconditional secure under
some condition. Let us recall their construction and their result about the security analysis.
• Key generation: A trusted authority randomly generates M + 1 polynomials
P0(x), P1(x), · · · , PM(x) ∈ Fql [x] and choose V distinct values x1, · · · , xV ∈ Fql .
These polynomials are of degree k − 1, and we denote them by
Pi(x) = ai,0 + ai,1x + ai,2x2 + · · · + ai,k−1xk−1, i = 0, 1, · · · , M .
• Key distribution: The trusted authority gives as private key to the source S the
M + 1 polynomials (P0(x), · · · , PM(x)), and as private key for each verifier Ri
the M + 1 valuations of polynomials at x = xi, namely (P0(xi), · · · , PM(xi)), i =
1, 2, · · · , V . The values x1, · · · , xV are made public. The keys can be given to the
nodes when they sign up for a service protected by this scheme.
• Authentication tag: Let us assume that the source wants to send n data messages
s1, s2, · · · , sn ∈ F
l
q. Choose and fix an Fq-linear isomorphism between Flq and Fql ,
then consider they have the same elements. The source computes the following
polynomial in Fql [x]:
Asi(x) = P0(x) + siP1(x) + sqi P2(x) + · · · + sq
M−1
i PM(x)
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which forms the authentication tag of each si, i = 1, · · · , n. Instead of sending the
original messages s1, s2, · · · , sn, the source actually sends packets ~xi of the form
~xi = [1, si, Asi(x)] ∈ F1+l+klq , i = 1, · · · , n .
The security of the authentication scheme above proven by Oggier and Fathi is as fol-
lows:
Proposition 2.1 ([1]). Consider a multicast network implementing linear network coding,
among which nodes V of them are verifying nodes owning a private key for authentication.
The above scheme is an unconditionally secure network coding authentication code against
a coalition of up to k − 1 adversaries, possibly among the verifying nodes, in which every
key can be used to authentication up to M messages, under the assumption that H 6 M,
where H is the sum of numbers of the incoming edges at each adversary.
3. Linear Substitution/Pollution Attacks to their Scheme
In the security analysis given by Oggier and Fathi, they focused on solving the system of
linear equations on variables ai, j to recover the private key of other node. Actually, notice
that the authenticated vectors ~xi above are nearly linear on messages, so we can implement
linear substitution attack to their scheme. In some papers[??], they have noticed that it
is not secure to use linear authentication codes on linear network. And they considered
a new type of substitution attack. Also, they pointed out that the authentication code of
Oggier and Fathi is non-linear so that it should be still secure. Next, we present our linear
substitution attack in details.
Suppose the coalition of malicious verifying nodes can carry out decoding of the net-
work coding, i.e., the coalition of their global kernels has rank not less than the minimum
cut of the network, for instance, the coalition of malicious verifying nodes contains one
destination node. In this case, they can decode the tagged messages sent by the source
node:
~xi = [1, si, Asi(x)] for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
For any a1, a2, · · · , an ∈ Fq such that
a1 + a2 + · · · + an = 1 ,
replace ~xn by ~x′n =
∑n
i=1 ai~xi. Next, we show that in this way each verifying node can not
notice this substitution attack.
Verification of Linear Substitution Attack:
The vector of any incoming edge at any node is of the form
n−1∑
i=1
αi~xi + αn~x
′
n = [
n∑
i=1
αi,
n−1∑
i=1
αi si + αn s
′
n,
n−1∑
i=1
αiAsi(x) + αnAs′n(x)]
for some α1, α2, · · · , αn ∈ Fq. Then
∑M
i=1
(∑n−1
j=1 α js j + αn s
′
n
)qi−1
Pi(x) + P0(x)(∑nj=1 α j)
=
∑M
i=1
(∑n−1
j=1 α js
qi−1
j + αn s
′qi−1
n
)
Pi(x) + P0(x)(∑nj=1 α j)
=
∑M
i=1
(∑n−1
j=1 α js
qi−1
j + αn
∑n
t=1 at s
qi−1
t
)
Pi(x) + P0(x)(∑nj=1 α j)
=
∑M
i=1 Pi(x)
(∑n−1
j=1 α j s
qi−1
j
)
+ αn
∑M
i=1 Pi(x)
(∑n
t=1 at s
qi−1
t
)
+P0(x)(∑nj=1 α j)
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equals to
∑n−1
i=1 αiAsi(x) + αnAs′n(x)
=
∑n−1
i=1 αi
(
P0(x) +∑Mt=1 sq
t−1
i Pt(x)
)
+αn
(
(∑n−1j a j)P0(x) +∑Mt=1 s′q
t−1
n Pt(x)
)
= (∑ni=1 αi)P0(x) +∑n−1i=1 ∑Mt=1 αi sq
t−1
i Pt(x)
+αn
∑M
t=1
(∑n
j=1 a js
qt−1
j
)
Pt(x)
= (∑ni=1 αi)P0(x) +∑Mt=1
(∑n−1
i=1 αis
qt−1
i
)
Pt(x)
+αn
∑M
t=1
(∑n
j=1 a js
qt−1
j
)
Pt(x)
for all x ∈ Fql . In other words, it can be verified by any verifying node using his private
key.
From the above argument, we can see that any node in the network can easily make
pollution to the network flow in the way that the node replaces any one or more of the
vectors he received by linear combinations of his incoming vectors whose coefficients have
sum 1 and then the node processes the network coding with the new vectors.
Finally, we point out that even if Oggier and Fathi’s scheme can work fruitfully, the
condition H 6 M can also be removed. Note that the condition H 6 M is very critical in
a network. The proof is similar to the proof given by Oggier and Fathi. They wrote the
secret parameters A = (ai, j) as a column vector in the order as following
~a = (a0,1, a0,2, · · · , a0,k, a1,1, · · · , a1,k, · · · , aM,1, aM,2, · · · , aM,k)T ,
where GT represents the transpose of the matrix G, and they rewrote the system of linear
equations using ~a. Then they computed the rank of the coefficient matrix, finally they
concluded that under the condition H 6 M the rank of the coefficient matrix is less than
the number of variables k(M + 1). Actually, if we rewrite the secret parameters A = (ai, j)
as a column vector in the following order
~a′ = (a0,1, a1,1, · · · , aM,1, a0,2, · · · , aM,2, · · · , a0,k, a1,k, · · · , aM,k)T .
Then we obtain a new system of linear equations on ai, j using ~a′. In this way, we can easily
show that the rank of the coefficient matrix is always less than the number of variables. So
the system of linear equations does always have solutions. Next, we give the details.
Suppose a group of K malicious nodes collaborate to recover A and make a substitution
attack. Without loss of generality, we assume that the malicious nodes are R1, R2, · · · , RK .
Suppose the global encoding kernel at the verifying node Ri is
Hi =

h(i)1,1 h
(i)
1,2 · · · h
(i)
1,n
h(i)2,1 h
(i)
2,2 · · · h
(i)
2,n
...
...
. . .
...
h(i)
e(i),1 h
(i)
e(i),2 · · · h
(i)
e(i),n

.
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Each Ri has some information about the secret parameter matrix A = (ai, j):
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, js j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, js
q
j · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, js
qM−1
j∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, js j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, js
q
j · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, js
qM−1
j
...
...
...
. . .
...∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), js j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), js
q
j · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), js
qM−1
j

· A
=

∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, jL1(s j)
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, jL2(s j) · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, jLk(s j)∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, jL1(s j)
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, jL2(s j) · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, jLk(s j)
...
...
. . .
...∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), jL1(s j)
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), jL2(s j) · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), jLk(s j)

and
A ·

1
xi
...
xk−1i

=

P0(xi)
P1(xi)
...
PM(xi)

.
The group of malicious nodes combines their equations, and they get a system of linear
equations
(1)


D1
...
DK
 · A =

C1
...
CK
 ,
A ·

1 1 · · · 1
x
q
1 x
q
2 · · · x
q
K
...
...
. . .
...
x
qk−1
1 x
qk−1
2 · · · x
qk−1
K

=

P0(x1) P0(x2) · · · P0(xK)
P1(x1) P1(x2) · · · P1(xK)
...
...
. . .
...
PM(x1) PM(x2) · · · PM(xK)

,
where
Di =

∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, js j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, js
q
j · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, js
qM−1
j∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, js j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, js
q
j · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, j~s
qM−1
j
...
...
...
. . .
...∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), js j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), js
q
j · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), js
qM−1
j

and
Ci =

∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, jL1(s j)
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, jL2(s j) · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, jLk(s j)∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, jL1(s j)
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, jL2(s j) · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, jLk(s j)
...
...
. . .
...∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), jL1(s j)
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), jL2(s j) · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), jLk(s j)

.
Denote
S n =

1 s1 sq1 · · · s
qM−1
1
1 s2 sq2 · · · s
qM−1
2
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 sn sqn · · · s
qM−1
n

.
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Then
Di = Hi · S n .
Lemma 3.1. If K 6 k − 1, then there exists exact ql(M+1−r0)(k−K) matrices A satisfying the
system of equations (1), where
r0 = rank


H1S n
H2S n
...
HKS n


.
Proof. Recall the system (1)


H1S n
...
HKS n
 · A =

C1
...
CK
 ,
A ·

1 1 · · · 1
x
q
1 x
q
2 · · · x
q
K
...
...
. . .
...
x
qk−1
1 x
qk−1
2 · · · x
qk−1
K

=

P0(x1) · · · P0(xK)
P1(x1) · · · P1(xK)
...
. . .
...
PM(x1) · · · PM(xK)

.
Rewrite the matrix A of variables as a single column of k(M + 1) variables. Then the
system (1) becomes
(2)

H1S n 0 0 0
0 H1S n 0 0
0 0
. . . 0
0 0 0 H1S n
...
...
. . .
...
HKS n 0 0 0
0 HKS n 0 0
0 0
. . . 0
0 0 0 HKS n
IM+1 x1IM+1 · · · xk−11 IM+1
IM+1 x2IM+1 · · · xk−12 IM+1
...
...
. . .
...
IM+1 xK IM+1 · · · xk−1K IM+1

·

a0,1
a1,1
...
aM,1
a0,2
a1,2
...
aM,2
...
a0,k
a1,k
...
aM,k

= T
where IM+1 is the identity matrix with rank (M + 1) and T is the column vector of the
constant terms in system (1) with proper order. Notice that
r0 = rank


H1S n
H2S n
...
HKS n


= rank


H1
H2
...
HK

· S n

6 min

rank

H1
H2
...
HK

, n

.
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Also note that rows of 
H1S n
H2S n
...
HKS n

is contained in the space FM+1q generated by x
j
i IM+1 if xi , 0. So the rank of the coefficient
matrix of System (2) to
r0k + (M + 1 − r0)K
which is less than the number of variables k(M + 1). So the system (2) has
ql(k(M+1)−(r0k+(M+1−r0)K)) = ql(M+1−r0)(k−K)
solutions, i.e., the system (1) has ql(M+1−r0)(k−K) solutions. 
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss the security of the authentication code given by Oggier and
Fathi and show our linear attack to their scheme, although it looks like non-linear. So we
point out that as the technique of linear network develops very fast, and it has invaded a lot
in our daily life, such as Internet TV, wireless networks, content distribution networks, P2P
networks and distributed file system, to give an efficient and unconditional secure authenti-
cation code for linear network against the original substitution/pollution attack considered
by Oggier and Fathi is extremely urgent.
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